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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5141
There is no doubt that on average the performance of 
state financial institutions around the world has been 
below the lowest expectations. Lack of governance, 
management skills, regulation, and transparency, and 
misguided incentives have contributed to discredit 
these institutions for supporting the development of 
local financial markets. However, the pro-active role 
that some state financial institutions have played in the 
recent crisis in allocating credit to sectors cyclically not 
attractive for commercial banks has brought back the 
question of whether some state ownership in the banking 
This paper—a product of the Financial Systems Department, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to strengthen financial systems by improving the quality and effectiveness of state 
interventions in finance.. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
author may be contacted at hrudolph@worldbank.org.  
system would be preferable. This paper analyzes the 
experience of four state financial institutions that have 
performed relatively well in the past: Canada’s Business 
Development Bank, Chile’s BancoEstado, South Africa’s 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, and Finland’s 
Finnvera plc. The author finds that these institutions 
have different checks and balances to mitigate eventual 
mismanagement of resources. The author also finds that 
little progress has been made in measuring the policy 
performance of these institutions.  
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1.  Introduction 
In the past three decades the presence of State Financial Institutions (SFIs) has been highly 
controversial. The evidence suggests that state-owned banks have underperformed and have 
negatively impacted economic growth. La Porta et al. (2002) find that government ownership of 
banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development, lower economic growth and 
lower growth of productivity.  Beck and Levine (2002) fail to find any positive effect of 
government ownership of banks on growth.  Caprio and Martinez Peria (2002) show that 
government ownership of banks is associated with a higher likelihood of banking crises. Dinc 
(2005) provides evidence that state financial institutions increase their lending during an election 
year and that in emerging markets state financial institutions finance the government to a greater 
degree than do private banks.  Most of the poor performance of SFIs is related to the lack of a 
clear mandate, and a governance system that allows the presence of weak boards of directors and 
management, which are subject to political intervention.  Evidence provided by Caprio et al. 
(2004), La Porta et al. (2002), and Dinc (2005) shows that most state financial institutions around 
the world are characterized by lack of managerial skills and subject to government intervention 
in credit decisions.   
This paper discusses good practices for aligning the functions of SFIs with solving market 
failures. Mismanagement of resources is frequently a consequence of weak board of directors 
and management, political interference, and lack of a clear mission of the SFI.  Based on four 
case studies, this paper analyzes the importance of having clear and sustainable mandates, and an 
institutional framework able to mitigate political interference. The paper analyzes good practices 
                                                            
1 
1 The author is a Senior Financial Sector Specialist in the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice- 
Presidency of the World Bank (hrudolph@worldbank.org). The author would like to thank senior management at 
BDC, BancoEstado, Finnvera, and DBSA for providing insightful information for this note; David Scott, Jerome 
Nycz, Lily Chu, and Francisco Bernasconi for useful comments; and Denisa Mendelsohn for valuable research 
assistance.  The paper is part of a larger effort in the department to strengthen financial systems by improving the 
quality and effectiveness of state interventions in finance. The views presented in this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of the World Bank. 3 
 
for building, implementing, financing, and evaluating the mandates of SFIs, and examines the 
experiences of these SFIs regarding the ownership and nomination of board members. 
The analysis is based on four case studies of wholly state owned banks: Canada’s Business 
Development Bank (BDC), Chile’s BancoEstado, South Africa’s Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA), and Finland’s Finnvera plc. While attempting to diversify the geographical pool 
of our case studies, we selected these four state owned banks because they, in our opinion, 
operate successfully within their predetermined set of targets, exist in a sound functioning 
regulatory framework, and can be regarded as benchmarks for other state financial institutions.   
Three of the four banks are development banks, and BancoEstado is the only commercial bank, 
but with a social objective. 
BDC, a Canadian development bank, is the only state owned bank in Canada. It provides support 
to Canadian entrepreneurship, with special emphasis on SMEs. While lending to Canadian 
businesses is the main area of business, BDC is also involved in venture capital, consulting, and 
subordinate financing. BancoEstado is the third largest commercial bank in Chile and also the 
only government owned bank. Although it is increasingly evolving towards a universal bank, its 
main social focuses are supporting access to financial services for poor or geographically 
isolated individuals, lending to micro- and small businesses, and housing financing for low 
income people.  DBSA is one of the four state owned development banks in South Africa.  Its 
main objective is to facilitate financing and technical assistance to companies and municipalities 
with a focus on infrastructure funding.  It also provides financing to large infrastructure projects 
in neighboring countries. DBSA taxable profits go to DBSA Development Fund, a subsidiary of 
DBSA, main objective of which is to provide support to low income municipalities through 
grants, deployment of technical expertise, training and identification of projects. Finnvera plc, 
the only state owned financial institution in Finland, provides funding to SMEs, and promotes 
internationalization of the Finnish companies. Finnvera operates also as an export credit agency 
(ECA). 
The paper highlights the need for defining clear and sustainable mandates aimed at solving a 
market failure. Both BDC and Finnvera have clear and sustainable mandates and play a role that 
is complementary to that of privately owned commercial banks.  As the mandates of 
BancoEstado and DBSA are less clearly defined, they get more engaged in competing with 
privately owned commercial banks.  The Corporate Plan of SFIs is a useful tool that owners can 
use to focus and monitor their mandates.  In the case of DBSA, for example, the Corporate Plan 
imposes targets that emphasize the development impact of the bank over the commercial aspects 
of the operations.   The paper emphasizes the importance of self-financing of the mandates and 
limiting the distortions on the rest of the financial sector. All of the SFIS analyzed fund 
themselves from the market, which has helped to impose market discipline on the management. 
High quality of management and boards of directors are one of the common elements of the four 
cases analyzed. While competent board of directors and management in the cases of BDC and 4 
 
DBSA are a consequence of a transparent mechanism to bring independent directors to the bank, 
in the cases of Finnvera and to a less extent BancoEstado, they are a result of cultural factors. In 
all four cases, compensation to management, although lower than in privately owned commercial 
banks, is better than in the public sector.
2  A structure of clear ownership of these institutions is 
also analyzed.  The four SFIs have an identifiable owner inside the government, which in most of 
the cases monitors closely the activities of the SFI.  
The paper is separated into four sections, including this introduction. The second section 
discusses the mandate, in particular how to define a mandate, and the different experiences in 
implementing a mandate and funding the operations. The section also analyzes the indicators for 
measuring the public policy performance of SFIs. The third section discusses governance issues, 
putting particular attention on the ownership policies, the process of nomination of the board 
members and the professional qualifications of the management. The last section concludes. 
 
 
2.  The Mandate of SFIs 
 
2.1 Defining the Mandate 
The inability to define their objectives is one of the main problems of SFIs. Most countries have 
great difficulty in justifying the presence of SFIs.  In many cases, these SFIs are a legacy from 
past administrations that retain the political power to stop any attempts of reforming them. In 
other cases, it is in the interest of the government to maintain SFIs since it can leverage subsidies 
to groups of interest through the SFI. The SFI can simultaneously finance operations that have 
nothing to do with the objectives of the bank with cross subsidies from profitable sectors of the 
SFI. In order to be able to gain market share with these profitable businesses, SFIs offer rates 
below the market, which ends up not only crowding out the role of privately owned institutions, 
but creating large and fragile SFIs that are highly dependent on government support. 
 
Before creating an SFI, the government needs to identify the market failure that it is trying to 
solve.  Market failures are usually associated with a lack of financial support to certain groups of 
the population, for example in the agricultural sector, infrastructure sector or SMEs. A market 
failure can also exist on the liability side of the bank, more precisely caused by a lack of saving 
instruments for certain groups of the population. 
 
Once the market failure that requires resolving has been defined, the government needs to define 
the mechanisms to deal with the problem.  While in the past banks were one of the few 
alternatives, currently there are a broader set of alternatives that do not necessarily require the 
creation of a SFI. For example, weather related risks are a common impediment for the access to 
credit by farmers. While in the past the creation of agricultural state owned bank was seen as the 
                                                            
2 Public sector wages in Finland are not substantially different than market levels. 5 
 
solution to this problem, the use of more innovative solutions, including the use of catastrophe 
insurance, might be able to diversify the weather related risk towards other investors and 
facilitate the interest of commercial banks in lending to farmers.  Another example is in the area 
of infrastructure. The lack of long-term funding sources is a common impediment for 
infrastructure financing. Banks may see high risks in investing in long term projects.  While in 
the past the creation of state owned bank was seen as the solution to this problem, an active role 
of governments in developing an interest rate yield curve with government instruments may 
facilitate the interest of institutional investors in financing these long term investment projects. 
These pro-market developments provide targeted solutions to market failures and promote 
competition in the credit market. 
 
However, it might be the case that an SFI is the most efficient solution.  Even in developed 
economies, funding for venture capital and SMEs is still challenging. In most of the cases, the 
market fails to value the risk of these projects and provide limited funding. This opens the room 
for a more active involvement of the government in promoting financing to venture capital and 
SMEs. Some governments provide this support in a decentralized way (e.g. SBA in the USA), 
while others do it through development banks (e.g. BDC in Canada).  It is not our intention to 




In order to focus the activities of SFIs, their mandates should be stated in the law.  Since SFIs are 
created by law, the mandate should also be stated in the law.  Stating the mandate in the law has 
important benefits, especially for focusing the activities of the SFI. As the board and 
management of the SFIs become accountable for fulfilling the mandate, they become less open 
to pressures and involved in business that is the province of the private sector.  Based on the 
experience of the four cases, we propose that SFIs mandates should include at least three 
components: 
a.  A target sector 
b.  Rules of cooperation with the private sector 
c.  Minimum level of efficiency 
 
a.  Target sector 
The target sector needs be justified by a market failure. Typical market failures can be found in 
business that are considered to be too risky for commercial banks, including micro and SME 
lending, the agricultural sector, and sectors that require long term funding, such as infrastructure 
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and mortgages.  Since market failures are dynamic over time, governments need to review the 
mandates to periodically ensure that the market is unable to fulfill these functions.
4   
 
In order to focus the attention of directors and managers, the mandate of SFIs should be clear and 
specific, but should allow for flexibility for the SFIs to tailor its financial products to the market 
needs. Although broad mandates allow SFIs to diversify their portfolios better, they tend to 
create confusion about the real objectives of the SFI, opening room for cross subsidization, 
inefficiencies, and hidden operating losses.  A board of directors should have the flexibility to 
operate with different products to fulfill its mandate, including the use of loans, guarantees, 
securitized instruments and derivatives.
5   
 
However, the coverage of the target sector needs to be sizable enough to create a sustainable 
business for the SFI. Some countries create SFIs with the purpose of servicing specific sectors of 
the economy are not sufficient to ensure a sustainable business for the SFI over time.  The most 
common examples are SFIs involved in lending to farmers, in areas with scarce technical 
innovation, which ultimately become unprofitable for the SFI. If the target sector is not 
profitable, the SFIs became an institution that only leverages the subsidies from the government.
6  
Under these circumstances, the incentives for efficiency are blurred and the directors and 
managers lose their independence from the government. As discussed below, building a 
profitable business may require SFIs to build on targeted subsidies from the government, but 
they should avoid running an unprofitable business that may end up with losses and frequent 
recapitalizations.  
 
Mandates need to be revised on a regular basis and SFIs should disappear when the market need 
is no longer present. Self-perpetuation is one of the main problems of the SFIs. Governments 
should review and potentially revise the mandates at least once every decade in order to ensure 
that the market failure still exists and that the presence of the bank is still justified.  This sound 
practice is followed by Canada’s BDC. During a decade, it is likely that financial innovation may 
have created instruments to give access to sectors that, at the time when the Law was enacted, 






4 It is important to clarify that since the mandate is unclear, we do not see a permanent role of the state in the 
ownership of commercial banks.  In most of the cases, these institutions can be replaced by more efficient private 
institutions. 
5 This assumes that the SFI has the capacity to manage these risks and that the SFI is subject to prudential 
supervision. 
6 The situation of unsustainable banks gets worse when they are allowed to take deposits from public, since the 
likely failure of the bank implies that the government has to take the losses, rescue the depositors and add capital to 
the bank. 7 
 
b.  Rules of cooperation with the private sector 
 
In order to avoid public intervention in areas that are properly the domain of the private sector, 
the mandate needs to establish that SFIs should play a complementary role to that provided by 
privately owned commercial banks.  SFIs should complete markets not to act as a substitute for 
the role of private financiers. In this context, the mandates of SFIs should implicitly promote the 
participation of privately owned commercial banks.  SFIs may support the market in various 
ways, for example by segmenting the market and servicing mainly clients that are not serviced 
by others, by cooperating with commercial banks to make viable projects that otherwise would 
not be financed, or simply by developing products that may complement the role of commercial 
banks (i.e. guarantees or derivative products).   
 
Although SFIs should avoid getting involved in business that is more properly the province of 
the private sector, under certain circumstances SFIs may want to keep some presence in these 
markets. De la Torre and Ize (2009) suggest that commercial banks suffer from cyclical changes 
in risk aversion, becoming more risk averse in periods of recession. This market failure may 
justify some limited but permanent presence of SFIs in markets that are serviced by the private 
sector, which might be affected by cyclical factors.  If the role of the SFI is to serve as a buffer in 
the event of a contraction in credit, the SFI needs to understand the market and therefore some 
permanent presence is justified.  SFIs will only be able to expand their credit portfolios quickly, 
if they have internal knowledge of the market. SFIs need to be existing market participants and 
insiders of the credit market in order to expand effectively their activities when needed. 
 
 
c.  Efficiency 
The mandate should establish that the state expects some type of return on its capital. The 
mandate does not need to specify the rate of return, but it should say that the SFI needs to be 
financially sustainable over time.  The requirement for financial sustainability is about creating 
the incentives for the board of directors and the management of the institution to make proper 
use of the available resources.  If profits are not an objective, the administration of the SFI may 
have fewer incentives to conduct adequate risk management.  Unprofitable SFIs that receive 
regular support from the government have incentives to hide operational inefficiencies in those 
losses. 
 
While in most markets efficiency can be attained through competition, in less competitive 
markets (such as those of SFIs) it is necessary to establish some minimum parameters of 
efficiency.  With the exception of BancoEstado, the other analyzed banks look for a return that at 
least resembles the cost of funding of the state.  As a commercial bank, BancoEstado requires a 
higher return on capital than the other banks.  Some exposure to competition to SFIs that act as 
buffer to cyclical behavior of banks might be healthy, as it imposes an additional benchmark for 8 
 
measuring performance. For example BancoEstado has benefited enormously from competition, 
but at the price of involving a state institution in business that should belong to the private sector.   
 
Comparative analysis 
In most of the cases, mandates in the four cases analyzed do not fulfill these three criteria. While 
the target sectors of BDC and Finnvera are relatively clear and specific, DBSA’s target sector is 
subject to interpretation. Target sectors of BancoEstado are not defined in the law, but are based 
on the view of the management and supervisory board.  While BDC and Finnvera do not 
compete with the private sector but cooperate with them in the structuring of financing for 
companies, DBSA and BancoEstado compete with private business to make money to serve 
sectors that are less serviced by commercial banks. Although financial sustainability criteria are 
not included in the mandate of the cases analyzed, all of them operate with minimum criteria of 
efficiency. Table 1 provides a description of the main elements of the mandates. 
 
Table 1. Structure of the Mandate  
  Market Failure  Competition  Efficiency 
BDC  SME  BDC does not compete 
with commercial banks, as 
it provides financing for 
higher risk transactions and 
prices for risk by security 
shortfall 
Minimum ROE should be 
equal to the Government 
long-term cost of capital 
BancoEstado  Broadly defined in the 
Law, but focuses on micro 
and SME lending, and 
mortgage financing for low 
income people 
Compete with commercial 
banks 
Minimum ROE should be 
similar to other 
commercial banks 
DBSA  Municipal Infrastructure  Competes with commercial 
banks, but requires 
minimum co-funding with 
other institutions 
Minimum ROE should be 
at least 10 percent 
Finnvera  SME Cooperates  with 
commercial banks to 
facilitate financing to 
companies 
Minimum ROE should be 
at least equal to the six-
month Euribor rate 
Source: World Bank 
 
 










BDC’s mandate has an important number of advantages: first, it is short and clear, defining the 
objective as supporting Canadian entrepreneurship, with particular consideration to the need of 
SMEs. Secondly, it defines the role of BDC as complementary to the commercial banks and 
mainly for the purpose of completing the market. Thirdly, it allows BDC to operate with multiple 
instruments (loans, investments and guarantees), which gives the Board and the management of 
the company the necessary flexibility to service its clients. Although it is not in its mandate, the 
government requires BDC to be commercially viable and to earn a return on equity at least equal 
to the Government’s average long-term cost of capital.  
 
BDC has a high quality database with disaggregated data on Canadian SME companies since 
1980, which together with state of the art risk management systems allow BDC to price by risk 
and to run a profitable business in segments of the market that are not serviced by commercial 
banks. BDC is generally more expensive than the market in funding companies / projects that 
have other sources of funding, but it is an attractive source of funding for riskier projects that are 
less attractive or unattractive to commercial banks.  On the basis of rational decision making, 
borrowers with other sources of funding do not use BDC.
8   
 
Since pricing is the source of market selection, many companies initially funded with BDC look 
for refinancing with commercial banks at cheaper rates.  Approximately 6.5 percent of BDC’s 
clients fully prepay their loans every year (based on average of number of clients over the past 
ten years). While a commercial bank may consider this as a business failure as the model 
depends on keeping the good clients, BDC considers this a success since projects can get funding 
directly from the market and do not depend on official support. However, this imposes an 
important challenge on the BDC management to bring new clients and rebuild the portfolio of 
clients on a regular basis. As a term lender (with minimum term offering of five years), BDC’s 
average portfolio term is approximately seven years. 
 
BDC has also implemented other mechanisms to avoid displacing the private sector. First, it 
works in partnership with all other Canadian financial institutions in support of Canadian SMEs 
in an effort to complement their services rather than compete with them. Secondly, BDC has 
invested in corporate research that regularly tracks changes in the SME market conditions and 
identifies needs of the Canadian SMEs that are not being serviced by other financial institutions. 
In this context, BDC examines the impact of BDC products and services on the SME market as 
well as on other financial institutions. BDC conducts SME research via its own internal 
resources, and also partners with external third parties (Industry Canada, CIRANO, and Statistics 
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vision of the projects, in particular during stress episodes. BDC participates also with in pari passu lending. 10 
 
Canada). The results of the research are incorporated into BDC’s processes to better execute the 
mandate and avoid displacing private sector financial services activity. 
 
Finnvera’s Act defines the mandate as follows: 
“... to provide financing services to promote and develop business, particularly that of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, and to promote and develop the exports and internationalization of 
enterprises. In its operations, the State-owned specialized financing company shall promote the 
State’s regional policy goals. Operations shall focus on shortcomings in the supply of financing 
services”. 
“The company pursues financing by granting and administering credits, guarantees and other 
contingent liabilities, and making equity investments. The company also carries out research and 
surveys related to business financing and provide enterprises with development assistance, 
services, and advice”. (The Act on the State-Owned Specialized Financing Company 18 June 
1998/443) 
The mandate of Finnvera is clearly articulated and touches on most of the relevant issues. First, it 
provides a clear definition of Finnvera’s purpose: to promote and develop SME business, 
promote and develop the export sector, and to foster internationalization Finnish enterprises. 
While the scope of the sectors in which it is mandated to operate is relatively broad, the areas of 
business are clearly specified.
9  Secondly, the mandate defines the role of Finnvera as 
complementary to the role of the financial sector (“shall focus on shortcomings” and “should 
supplement the financial market by providing financing to exports, SMEs and growth 
companies”). Thirdly, it gives Finnvera flexibility to operate with different instruments (credits, 
guarantees and other contingent liabilities) for servicing its mandate.   Although the law does not 
specify the commercial purpose of Finnvera, the government requires a minimum return on its 
capital, which in practice is equivalent to six-month Euribor rate.  
Finnvera does not compete with commercial banks, but cooperates with them in order to make 
feasible certain deals that would otherwise fail without the presence of a lender with longer-term 
perspective and less risk aversion.  Finnvera is rarely the only lender and typically participate in 
syndicated lending and provides funding and guarantees.  In many cases, it takes junior 
participation in syndicated lending or first losses.  Finnvera conducts rigorous risk assessments 
of the projects before participating in these deals, and the assessments are supported by risk 
management models and skilled employees and management.  
 
In the case of BancoEstado, the mandate is only broadly defined in the law: “the objective of the 
bank is to provide banking and financial services to support the development of the activities in 
                                                            
9 Finnvera is also an Export Credit Agency. 11 
 
the country…” However, in our interviews with current and former members of the management 
board, we noticed a more specific common ground among them: “the mission of BancoEstado is 
to maximize a social function subject to having a rate of return similar to the rest of the banking 
industry.”  Although this statement is not written in any official document, it seems to reflect the 
implied mandate that the management board has followed in the last two decades.
10  Although 
having an implicit mandate is an important shortcoming compared with having a mandate that is 
written in the law, this implicit mandate has certain advantages and shortcomings. Firstly, it does 
not specify the target sector, which opens room for the bank to develop multiple activities and to 
divert its attention from its primary purpose. Secondly, although the implicit mandate assumes 
that BancoEstado’s target market is related to sectors that are not serviced by privately owned 
commercial bank, it fails to address the issue of competition with commercial banks. As 
discussed below, BancoEstado competes with other commercial banks in multiple areas of 
business. Thirdly, the implicit mandate imposes on the management a minimum requirement in 
terms of return on equity, which has been essential for bringing efficiency to the bank. 
BancoEstado competes with the private sector in multiple areas of business. The management of 
BancoEstado sees the competition as a way of improving efficiency and accomplishing the 
minimum returns that are required by the government.  In our interviews, we observed that the 
current and past management of BancoEstado have seen competition as a mechanism for 
improving the efficiency of the bank and for creating expertise in the design of financial 
solutions to the less well serviced sectors of the economy. Since BancoEstado does not receive 
any subsidies from the government,
11 it sees the need for accessing the profitable parts of the 
market, including lending to large companies, in order to generate resources for supporting its 
mandate and achieving its financial targets. The lack of subsidies from the state and the fact that 
BancoEstado plays on a level field makes it existence less controversial with privately owned 
commercial banks.  
 
In our interviews with current and former executives of BancoEstado, we noticed a firm defense 
of their participation in the businesses that are properly the purview of the private sector. They 
argued that it in Chile it would not be commercially feasible to run a niche bank that focuses 
exclusively on lending to low income households, microenterprises and SMEs.  Some attempts, 
including those by Banco del Desarrollo in Chile, were unable to develop the scale and to bring 
the technology, management, and expertise that is necessary to run a business like this.  The 
business model of BancoEstado requires all the investments to be profitable from the operational 
                                                            
10  The annual report articulates BancoEstado mission as: “to be a universal bank, of all and for all, offering 
integrated financial services so that every Chilean, everywhere, can undertake entrepreneurial activities and 
develop.”  In our interviews we did not notice that current and former senior management team had this mission 
internalized. 
11 In the past, BancoEstado received an implicit subsidy since it managed all the banking accounts of the 
government. With double digit inflation levels, and a government unable to manage its assets actively, BancoEstado 
was receiving a substantial amount of resources. The reduction in the levels of inflation and the active cash 
management of government accounts reduced this source of funding to a level that is practically irrelevant.  12 
 
perspective, but the activities in the underserviced sectors of the economy (e.g. micro and SME 
lending) would be unable to be profitable without infrastructure provided by the bank, including 
the network of branches, and risk management systems.  BancoEstado representatives argue that 
these business areas became feasible to service once the bank had the technical and human 
infrastructure to operate in them.  BancoEstado also see the competition as a powerful tool for 
efficiency, which would have not been present if the bank had focused only on the less 
competitive targeted sectors of the economy.  
 
DBSA’s regulations define the bank’s mandate as focusing on “the provision of financial, 
technical and other assistance to achieve the objectives of the bank, with a focus on its 
investment activities on infrastructure funding, broadly defined, and with the object of acting as 
a catalyst to maximize private sector access to opportunities in the provision of public funding.”  
Firstly, DBSA’s target sector is broadly defined, which leaves room for interpretation about the 
meaning of infrastructure funding.  In fact, the management of the institution has a broad 
interpretation of the concept, the boundaries of which are not clear.  In addition, DBSA has the 
objective of generating profits with the purpose of transferring the taxable revenues to support 
DBSA Development Fund. However, this arrangement might be conflicting with the objective of 
supporting infrastructure projects for middle income municipalities.
12 The reason is that while 
DBSA Development Fund focuses almost exclusively on financing of the poorest municipalities 
and DBSA may be under constant pressure to generate enough profits and may, thus, be more 
motivated to provide financing to large municipalities that result in higher profits.  We see high 
value added in the resources invested by DBSA Development Fund, as it allows these 
municipalities to build capacity to have access to the financial sector in the future, but the link 
between DBSA profits and DBSA Development Fund may justify more involvement of DBSA 
in private projects that are not related to the mandate.  Since DBSA Development Fund is mainly 
a provider of subsidies, we do not see a reason for linking its funds to the performance of DBSA. 
Secondly, the DBSA mandate does not address the complementary nature of its activities, and 
therefore DBSA gets regularly involved in the financing of private infrastructure projects. With 
the exception of lending to medium size municipalities, which represents about 30 percent of the 
value of its investments in 2007/08, most of the lending of DBSA is in competitive markets, 
including lending to large municipalities, private infrastructure projects, and premium 
international operations.
13  DBSA has minimum targets in terms of co-financing with private 
financiers in order to ensure a complementary role of DBSA.  Thirdly, although it is not defined 
                                                            
12 DBSA Development Fund serves to unlock municipal infrastructure grants and other resources from the 
government through the deployment of technical expertise to under-skilled municipalities to accelerate the 
implementation of infrastructure projects, mainly in the areas of sanitation and water. 
13 Premium international operations are typically large infrastructure projects in neighboring countries that have the 
guarantees from the respective governments. 13 
 
in the mandate, the corporate plan adds some tension between conducting prudent banking and 
maximizing development impact.  DBSA’s target is a return on equity of 5 percent per annum.
14 
 
2.2 Implementing the Mandate 
It is not only necessary to have a clearly delimited mandate, but also to be able to implement it. 
Therefore, SFIs need to put in place mechanisms to bring mandates into the priorities of the 
company. Traditional mechanisms include the development of a corporate plan and some type of 
performance indicators for aligning the business strategy with the mandate of the company. 
 
Table 2 Main Highlights in Corporate Plans 
BDC BancoEstado  DBSA  Finnvera 
Client Satisfaction  Financial Results   Development Impact   Minimum amount of 
guarantees and loans 
Employment Engagement  Client Satisfaction   Sustainability   Minimum lending to 
startups 




Outstanding BDC Financing Portfolio    Distribution of lending by 
risk category (minimum 
percentage of lending to 
riskier segments of the 
market) 
BDC Consulting Revenue      Employment creation 
(typically estimated by the 
companies) 
Return on Common Equity      Minimum ratio between 
loans and guarantees 
   Maximum  lending  to 
affiliates 
   E C A   o b j e c t i v e s  
   Efficiency  cost  ratio 
   Capital  adequacy  ratio. 
Sources: BDC, BancoEstado, DBSA and Finnvera 
As shown in Table 2, governments/SFIs have different approaches for implementing the 
mandates. While the BDC mandate is well defined and the company is focused on the target 
sector, the performance indicators are more aligned with client satisfaction and efficiency. In 
DBSA’s case, with a more broadly defined mandate, the performance indicators put more 
emphasis on aligning DBSA’s business with a more specific mandate. Finnvera’s corporate plan 
                                                            
14 South African privately owned commercial banks typically have a 10 percent return as a target, 14 
 
imposes clear targets for the business areas that are in line with the government goals.  
BancoEstado’s social objectives are diluted in the corporate plan and performance indicators.  
Consistency in performance indicators is an issue that requires further analysis. For example, 
BDC does not include job creation as an indicator, because it may contradict the objective of 
creating sustainable business in Canada. 
In the case of DBSA, the Treasury approves DBSA’s corporate plan on an annual basis. The 
corporate plan includes also the corporate balanced scorecard, which has three components: 
development impact, sustainability and organizational capability. It is interesting to note that as a 
mechanism to focus the role of DBSA, development aspects have substantive weight in the 
overall performance measure of DBSA.  As shown in Table 3, 50 percent of the development 
impact component is about the effectiveness of key development initiatives, which gives a clear 
signal of DBSA’s priorities.  
 
Table 3.  DBSA Corporate Balanced Scorecard 2008/09  
Development Impact  Sustainability Organizational  Capability 
(56%) (24%)  (20%) 
Development Fund 
Performance (20%) 
Corporate credit rating 
(10%) 
Staff satisfaction with internal 
knowledge management (25%) 
Customer and partner 
satisfaction (10%) 
Non performing book debt 
as a percentage of total book 
debt (20%) 
Market perception of the bank's image 
in the development finance scene 
(25%) 
Rand value of total 
disbursement (10%)  Sustainable earnings (20%) 
Percentage of acceptable vacancy 
levels (25%) 
Co-funding ratio (10%)  Cost to income ratio (20%)    
Share of total commitments to 
identified market segments 
(5%)       
Source DBSA 
While BDC’s corporate plan is defined for a five-year period and requires the approval of the 
government, the balanced performance measures are used for the internal performance 
evaluation. The performance measures include the following indicators: client satisfaction; 
employment engagement; efficiency ratio;
15 outstanding DBC financing portfolio (in dollars); 
BDC consulting revenue (in dollars); and return on common equity (ROE). These performance 
                                                            
15 Measured as the subordinate financing, operating and administrative expenses as a percentage of their net interest 
and other income. 15 
 
measures are more focused on client satisfaction and the efficiency of BDC, but are consistent 
with a bank that has a well defined mandate.  
Finnvera’s performance targets are defined by the Ministry of Employment and Economy in the 
annual corporate plan and include the following indicators:  Minimum amount of guarantees and 
loans; minimum lending to startups; minimum lending to growing and internationalizing 
companies;
16 distribution of lending by risk category (minimum percentage of lending to riskier 
segments of the market); employment creation (typically estimated by the companies); minimum 
ratio between loans and guarantees; maximum lending to affiliates; ECA objectives; efficiency 
cost ratio; and capital adequacy ratio. Finnvera’s corporate goals provide clear guidance to the 
administration regarding the segments of the market on which the management needs to focus. 
The Ministry of Employment and Economy follows the accomplishment of these objectives on a 
regular basis. 
In the case of BancoEstado, the corporate plan highlights the bank as a universal (commercial) 
bank that provides all types of financial services to nationals. The government does not 
participate in the formulation or approval of the corporate plan. Performance indicators are more 
aligned with those of any other commercial bank, with only a hidden attention to the social 
objectives of the company. As shown in Table 4, the 2008 balanced scorecard included three 
components: financial results (30 %); client satisfaction (42%); and organizational capability (28 
%). Only one social objective is included in the client satisfaction area, but refers to the liability 
management side of the bank (increasing the network of points of sales (caja vecina)).  The 
balanced scorecard makes no references to other social objectives such as the development of 
products for micro and SME lending, and mortgages for low-income people. 
 
Table 4 BancoEstado Balanced Scorecard 2008 
Financial Results  Client Satisfaction  Organizational 
Capacity 
(30%) (42%) (28%) 
Efficiency ratio  Sales through 
remote channels 
Operational costs 
Average ROE of 
commercial banks 




sources of revenues 




 Access  through 




16 Internationalizing companies are companies that are looking for euro or world scale 16 
 
2.3 Financing Policy Mandates 
In an ideal world, SFIs should be able to create a sustainable business within the boundaries of 
their mandate. With some exceptions, this has proven to be difficult and begs the question that if 
the business within the mandate is profitable, why it has not been exploited by the private sector.  
In many cases, SFIs have to rely on some other sources of financing, including cross subsidies, 
and direct support from the government. This section analyzes the effects of different sources of 
financing on the incentives of the management and board of directors of the SFIs. This section 
also discusses the importance of funding sources for the SFIs. 
a.  Target sector is profitable 
The ideal way of financing the mandate is to develop a sustainable business model in the sector 
that the SFI is trying to support. This is a Pareto superior result, since the SFI is providing 
financial services to underserviced sectors, the management has the right incentives and there are 
no social costs attached.  However, this is not easy to achieve, since it implies that the public 
sector is more efficient than the private sector in providing services to certain segments of the 
market.  Some market failures may open opportunities for creating SFIs that are self sustainable 
with narrow business models, for example the public sector may have a lower discount premium 
than the private sector in projects with long maturity.  Due to the lack of development of a yield 
curve, SFIs may be willing to take more interest rate risk and to be more efficient than the 
private sector in the financing of housing and infrastructure.  
b.  Target sector generates operational profits 
Although some SFIs can create profitable business in sectors that are underserviced by the 
commercial banks, the revenues may not capable of financing the fixed costs of the project. In 
order to be able to run a profitable business, the financial services offered to target sectors 
require operating on the broader platform of the bank that includes distribution channels and risk 
management models. As the revenues of the business in the target sector might not be enough to 
cover these costs, SFIs may need to get involved in other areas of business to secure the 
necessary infrastructure that can make viable this business.  
Relying on broader platforms requires SFIs to diversify into areas different from the target 
sector. Creating a large SFI that gets involved in businesses that are more properly the province 
of the private sector, with the purpose of funding a broader platform to ensure the SFI’s 
profitability might be costly from the social perspective.  Finding the right balance between the 
benefit of providing services to underserviced sectors and intervening in private business is a 
major challenge for policymakers. 
Strong governance structures and mature risk management systems in the SFI are important 
preconditions that need to be in place before attempting to target sectors with operational profits 
through SFIs. Providing a proper diagnostic of the business model and identifying the synergies 17 
 
that can be achieved within the platform of the SFI are essential for a successful involvement of 
an SFI in a specific sector of the economy. 
Development of a business model for the targeted sector may require sizable investments that are 
not easy to replicate with subsidies on transactions. In some cases, a sustainable business model 
for a specific sector of the economy might not emerge simply by subsidizing transactions from 
commercial banks because the development of a product require a number of studies and other 
investments whose costs are not easy to foresee by policymakers and are hard to develop in an 
experimental environment.  
Some may argue that once the financial technology for making profitable this particular business 
becomes available, it should be shared with (or sold to) the private sector.  Although this seems a 
reasonable argument on competition grounds, it does not solve the problem of the intervention of 
the public sector in businesses that should be administered by private sector. The contrary 
argument is that SFIs may have a role in developing financial solutions for underserviced 
sectors, prior to having private sector involvement. 
c.  Target sectors do not generate operational profits 
Governments might be interested in having SFIs that provide financing to sectors that are not 
profitable from the private perspective but have a high social rate of return. Although this is a 
valid option, the different alternatives impose externalities either on the market, the organization 
of the SFI, or in the incentives of the management.  SFIs might finance these businesses from 
different sources: 
  Cross subsidies from other business areas of the SFI. This model implies that the SFI 
needs to be involved in business areas that should be run by the private sector. As 
discussed above, this implies that greater involvement in business in which the private 
sector has comparative advantages.  The effect is neutral if the SFI plays by the rules of 
the market, and competes with other banks in the financing of companies, but the 
situation is different if the bank operates with different criteria, for example offering 
below market rate lending to companies, which may end up crowding out participation of 
private enterprises and having a negative effect on financial development. 
  Direct subsidies. The government may provide direct subsidies for lending in the targeted 
sectors. These subsidies can operate well, but in some cases might be insufficient for 
developing a sustainable business model for the SFI.  These direct subsidies assume that 
SFIs have a business model that allows them to operate properly, which might not be the 
case.  The main advantage of direct subsidies is that they could be offered to any banking 
institution, either private or state owned, and do not create distortions on the involvement 
of the SFI in what is essentially private business.  Privately owned commercial banks can 
be slower in responding to these subsidies, as they may be unfamiliar with the entities to 
which the subsidies are directed or the entities are not part of their core business. The 18 
 
provision of partial guarantees is an alternative way of giving direct support to lending 
operations in targeted sectors. 
  Lines of credit with subsidized interest rates. Lines of credit are a powerful funding 
mechanism when no other alternatives are available. However, they create a critical 
distortion in the risk management structure of SFIs.  SFIs that depend on lines of credit 
have the incentives to lend what they receive and to limit their operations by the amounts 
that the government is willing to offer depending on the budget. Lines of credit may 
create a dependence relationship between the government and the final destination of the 
funds, which creates room for political interference and mismanagement of the SFI 
portfolio. 
  Erosion of the SFI’s capital together with regulatory and supervisory forbearance. Some 
SFIs might be able to finance unprofitable projects with a softer regulatory and 
supervisory framework compared to other financial institutions.  This mechanism allows 
for inefficiencies and political interference in the company. Poorly regulated SFIs are 
likely to be request periodic recapitalizations, which creates dependence on the owner 
and may compromise the independence of the board.  SFIs should be subject to the same 
regulatory framework as other banks and therefore this approach should be avoided. 
  Allowing SFIs to take deposits from the public.  Due to lack of government funds, many 
governments allow SFIs to take deposits from the public.  The decision about allowing 
SFIs to take deposits from the public should depend on the objectives of the SFIs and 
should be driven by the need to meet those objectives than the funding requirements of 
the bank. Only SFIs that have an objective related to the development of savings market 
should be allowed to take deposits from the public.  It is necessary to take into 
consideration that deposit taking institutions require a more comprehensive supervisory 
framework than banks that only take wholesale funding.  Most importantly, funding of an 
unprofitable business with deposits is unsustainable, and will require permanent 
recapitalization of the business.  Consistent with the previous alternative, this mechanism 
should also be avoided. 
In the Canadian case, BDC is less risk averse than the private sector, and therefore willing to 
finance projects with higher risk. BDC has shown to be as efficient as the privately owned 
commercial banks, and has been able to create a profitable business from its target sector 
(Canadian SMEs). BDC has been maintaining a detailed database of its commercial relationship 
with Canadian SMEs since 1980. This has allowed BDC to understand better the risks inherent in 
these types of companies. In addition, BDC has developed sophisticated risk management system 
that has allowed them to price by risk and to run a sustainable business with SME.   
The management board of BancoEstado requires all business units of the bank to be 
operationally profitable, including its targeted sectors (e.g. micro and SME lending, and 
mortgage lending for low income people). However, these business units do not cover the fixed 
costs associated with the distribution channels, the back office, risk management systems, etc.   19 
 
These business units can leverage from the existing platform of the bank, but are less likely to 
survive as niche banks.  Since the clients of BancoEstado’s targeted sectors are not within the 
risk tolerance of the privately owned commercial banks, this business is unlikely to be an 
attractive privatization prospect. 
As Finnvera’s mandate includes both the development bank functions and export credit agency 
(ECA), the evaluation of its funding sources is more complicated. The ECA part has an 
automatic recapitalization component, which makes it difficult to evaluate the sustainability of 
the business model.  Although Finnvera conducts rigorous assessments of all its lending and 
guarantees, the size of some projects (mostly from ECA part) is above the prudential standards. 
Thus, Finnvera has provided guarantees for amounts close to USD 1 billion, while the capital is 
about one third of that amount.  Although Finnvera’s capital adequacy ratios are above the 
required levels, the presence of the ECA business has consequently imposed some regulatory 
forbearance.  From the bank sustainability perspective, it does not seem clear synergies exist 
between the ECA and the development bank, and we therefore we do not recommend this 
approach to other countries. 
In the case of DBSA, there are deliberate cross subsidies from the most profitable part of the 
bank (lending to large municipalities, financing of private projects and international operations) 
to the less profitable ones, such as lending to small municipalities.
17  Financing of social projects 
is offered at a subsidized interest rate, while competitive projects are offered at market rates.  All 
DBSA taxable profits go to DBSA Development Fund, and these resources are used to provide 
grants, deployment of technical expertise, training and identification of projects in poor 
municipalities.  
The funding sources of SFIs play an important role in the incentives for the board and 
management.  Funding from the market by issuing bonds is a good practice as it avoids one of 
the powerful tools that governments have to try to influence the credit decisions of the SFI; 
increases legitimacy of the SFI with the privately owned commercial bank; and gives clear 
incentives to increase the efficiency of the SFI. Funding from the market is preferable when it 
does not have the explicit guarantee of the state.  The four SFIs analyzed fund themselves from 
the market, but in some cases (e.g. BDC) the debt is with the full guarantee of the state. In other 
cases (e.g. Finnvera and DBSA), some of the bonds are issued with guarantee and other area not. 
It is important to note that in some countries the difference between one and the other can be 
substantial.  The bonds issued by BancoEstado do not have explicit guarantees from the state. 
 
                                                            
17 The subsidies come in the form of lower interest rates 20 
 
2.4 Measuring the Public Policy Performance of SFIs 
Since SFIs are established with a mandate to address a market failure, aside from evaluating the 
financial performance as other financial institutions, it is crucial to evaluate how well the SFIs 
fulfill this public policy mandate. In other words, it is important to evaluate the value added of 
SFIs compared with a case that they were not present. This feedback is useful not only to track 
the long-term impact of the SFI’s activities on the market, but also to align future strategies with 
government policies. 
However, quantifying the contribution of an SFI in addressing these market failures can be a 
challenge. Most of SFIs analyzed have not incorporated this type of evaluation in their 
performance measures, there are only few institutions that are in the process of developing a 
number of indicators/proxies to measure their special contribution dictated by their mandate.  
We found that SFIs are using different benchmarks to evaluate their contribution. While DBSA 
or Finnvera plc compares their achievements against predetermined (but arbitrary) targets, BDC 
compares its results with industry benchmarks and compares its SME clients’ performance with 
the performance of SMEs that received financing from other banks.  While measuring policy 
performance against some predetermined target does not help to understand whether the SFI 
provides any value added, comparing performance with a sample of individuals / companies that 
did not receive the support of the SFI provides more insightful information about the 
contribution of the SFI. 
BDC has created a number of indicators to examine their value added in the financial market. 
These include “business creation,” which compares the start-up authorizations BDC fostered 
compared with the market benchmarks; “business survival”, which compares how many BDC 
supported start-ups survived two years and five years compared with the industry benchmark. 
Finally, BDC uses a “business growth” indicator to evaluate how BDC clients perceive their 
pace of business growth compared to the SME market in general. These indicators seem to 
provide more comprehensive conclusions about the SFIs contribution and impact than more 
typical indicators used by other banks, such as the number of new authorizations or volume for 
loans, grants or equity originated by the bank.    
In 2008, BDC commissioned Statistics Canada to conduct an assessment of the impact of BDC 
financing and consulting services on Canadian businesses. Statistics Canada measured the impact 
quantitatively by comparing BDC clients’ performance to a group of non-BDC clients using four 
indicators: revenue growth, employment, business survival and profits growth between years 
2000-2005. The results show that BDC clients achieved better results in terms of revenue 
growth, employment growth, and business survival than non-BDC clients. In addition, the report 
shows that the BDC clients’ performance has further improved compared to non-BDC clients 
with every passing year after their decision to become BDC clients. Also, clients that used both 
BDC’s financing and consulting services achieved even better results than the ones that used just 21 
 
one type of service. Surprisingly, the results also indicated that the profit growth of BDC clients 
was lower than for non-BDC clients. However, this could be attributed to the fact that BDC 
provides longer-term financing and thus more stability, which may motivate BDC clients to 
increase their investment spending soon after securing BDC financing. 
One of the simplest ways of measuring the added value is evaluating the catalytic role in 
mobilizing and attracting funding from other financiers. DBSA and BDC uses a leverage ratio, 
which measures the ratio of the SFI’s funding relative to other’s funding, but this ratio is 
meaningful only if the SFI acts as the book runner of all the operations, otherwise it can be 
totally misleading.  
Other institutions are using some qualitative measures that evaluate the impact of the SFI on the 
overall institutional framework.  For example, the International Financial Corporation (IFC) has 
developed a number of qualitative tools to evaluate the institution’s accomplishment of the 
mandate, including the external impact on other variables, such as improved corporate 
governance, improved innovation or new regulation. This allows the IFC to identify the sequence 
of changes that occurred after their involvement, and determine, whether it was its involvement 
that lead to changes that, in turn, triggered an ex-post interest by private sector investors. 
While very important, the area of measuring policy performance still remains largely unchartered 
and will require further attention.  SFIs need to be able to justify their existence not only for their 
financial result, but also for the achievement of their goals compared with a scenario that the SFI 
were not present. 
 
3.  Governance of SFIs 
 
This section analyzes the corporate governance aspects of SFIs that will protect the SFI against 
government intervention.
18  Political intervention is one of the major threats for successfully 
functioning SFIs. This is typically a consequence of a lack of independence of the board of 
directors and senior management of the SFI and nontransparent communication between the SFI 
and its shareholders.
19  While governments might be tempted to use the SFI to fulfill their short 
term political needs at the cost of affecting the financial sustainability of the SFI, they do not 
want to take responsibility for their involvement.   
 
The risk of political intervention can be reduced by ensuring that the representative of the 
shareholders is precisely defined.  It is common to find SFIs where the entities and individuals 
                                                            
18 This section does not expect to serve as guidance for governance of SFIs.  For an exhaustive revision of principles 
of corporate governance applicable to SFIs see Scott (2007). 
19 Other state owned institutions face similar pressures, but the effect of these pressures on inadequate credit 
allocation can have more significant economic impact. 22 
 
functioning as shareholders are scattered among a larger number of different government 
institutions, creating the conditions for multiple pressures on the board or management that result 
in credit misallocation or other inefficiencies. Political intervention can also be limited by 
ensuring a transparent and structured process for the nomination of board members.  In order to 
ensure technical expertise, board members should be appointed in a transparent manner for a 
fixed period of time and they should be accountable for their actions in the same way as they are 
in public companies.  The senior management of the SFI should be selected and be held 
accountable by the board of directors.  The ownership policy, the nomination of board of 
directors, and the qualifications of the management are discussed in the following section. 
 
Defining the Ownership Policy 
The principal tasks associated with ownership include: participating in shareholders’ meetings 
and voting upon matters within the authority of shareholders; electing or removing members of 
the board of directors; and monitoring the performance of the company. 
Scott (2007) suggests that in order to help ensure a consistent and comprehensive approach to 
government ownership, governments should develop and publicly communicate an ownership 
policy that itself will command the confidence of the markets.   The policy should define the 
general terms and conditions which will apply to the government’s investment and the manner in 
which government will exercise its ownership.  The ownership policy should be based on a set of 
guiding principles that are associated with sound commercial practice and good corporate 
governance, as well as with competitive neutrality.  Sound commercial practices and good 
corporate governance should be applied to decisions regarding the amount, structure, terms and 
conditions, and subsequent handling of the investment.  In effect, the government should seek to 
mimic the practices of a private sector owner.   
A critical element in organizing the state ownership function is to make clear who is the 
responsible and accountable for representing the shareholder, and to define the shareholder 
representative’s roles and accountabilities.  In our four cases, there is a single Ministry 
responsible that acts as shareholder representative. Although we did not find explicit ownership 
policies in the four analyzed cases, various documents and regulations defined a number of 
principles applicable to ownership policies. 
The Ministry of Employment and Economy of Finland is the representative shareholder of 
Finnvera, and manages a portfolio of 21 state owned companies through the Corporate Steering 
Group inside the Ministry.  The role of the Corporate Steering group at the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy is to steer of the various policy sectors of the Ministry and its 
administrative sector in order to reconcile their actions with the strategic goals set by the 
Government.  The Corporate Steering group is active in coordinating the role of different 
agencies and SOEs, including Finnvera, to provide support to their clients. In many cases, the 23 
 
coordination of support from multiple agencies can result into a successful financing of 
companies. The Corporate Steering Group is in charge of defining the annual objectives of 
Finnvera, and this group reports to the Undersecretary of State, who is also Chairman of the 
board of Finnvera.  The decisions relating to the largest operations (typically from the ECA part 
of Finnvera) are not taken by the board, but by the Ministry of Employment and Economy or the 
Prime Minister directly.  As mentioned before, Finnvera is a case of heavy involvement of the 
government in the company, but the risks are mitigated by cultural factors. 
The Minister of Industry of Canada (Industry Canada) is BDC’s shareholder representative. The 
management of BDC is particularly interested in keeping the Minister of Industry informed 
about the activities of BDC.   According to BDC’s management, this allows them to avoid 
surprises and help BDC to run the bank smoothly. In this context, officials from the Ministry of 
Industry receive the same information as the members of the board of directors, and the 
management is willing to answer questions that the government may have. However, the 
management of the company does not take instructions from officials of the Ministry of Industry. 
The communications between the Minister of Industry and BDC take place directly between the 
Minister of Industry and the Chairman of the BDC.  Policy direction from the Federal 
Government is generally provided via Priorities Letters from the Minister of Industry to the 
Chairman of BDC’s Board of Directors. The priorities outlined in these letters influence the 
strategies and actions reflected in the Corporate Plan, which is ultimately recommended by the 
Board of Directors.  
The South African Treasury is the shareholder representative of DBSA and all the other 
development banks.
20   The Public Finance Act sets out a comprehensive framework for 
transparency and prudent operations of SOEs, and the shareholder compact defines the state’s 
ownership policy.  The Treasury gets involved in the approval of the (annual) Corporate Plan and 
in focusing the mandate of the institution. For example, in the last few years, it has requested 
DBSA to focus its attention more on small municipalities.  DBSA provides quarterly reports to 
the Ministry of Finance based on the plan, highlighting its achievements against the targets set in 
the corporate plan.   
The Chilean Ministry of Finance is the shareholder representative of BancoEstado.  During good 
times, the Ministry of Finance plays a passive role as the shareholder of the bank. The 
discussions between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance are mostly about the distribution of 
dividends.  During periods of recession, the Ministry of Finance has requested BancoEstado to 
pay particular attention to vulnerable sectors of the economy, but without interfering in the credit 
allocation process. On past occasions BancoEstado has also helped the government in providing 
liquidity to the banking sector.  BancoEstado’s management is proactive in finding financial 
solutions that may help with the objectives of the government.   
                                                            
20 The Department of Public enterprises is the representative shareholders of the other South African SOEs 24 
 
 
Nominating the Members of the Board of Directors 
An appropriately constituted, qualified and empowered board of directors is an essential 
component for good governance. In most of the countries, board members of SFIs are appointed 
politically, which may result in lack of skills and mismanagement of the SFI.  We analyzed cases 
where the appointment of board members has evolved to open and transparent mechanisms of 
selection of board members. While in BDC and DBSA the appointment of directors follow the 
best standards with high levels of transparency that promote independence and qualification for 
the positions, in BancoEstado and Finnvera, directors are appointed using political criteria. 
 
BDC and DBSA operate with a one board system, and have well developed system for the 
selection of board members. The Law establishes general fit and proper requirements for 
members of the board of directors. In both cases, a board committee prepares an assessment of 
the skill requirements of the board members, recommends skill requirements for the selection of 
new directors and assesses the capacities of the current board members.  A shortlist is typically 
prepared by professional headhunters and the list of candidates is presented to the shareholder 
representative (the government).  Although the government may decide not to select a candidate 
from the shortlist, and appoint an outsider, shareholders have typically accepted candidates from 
the shortlist.
21 In both cases the Chairman of the board and the CEO are different persons. While 
no government officials participate on the board of directors of BDC, the Ministry of Provincial 
and Local and Government is represented on the DBSA board (but this Ministry does not have a 
direct role in the ownership function). In both cases the CEO is not appointed by the board of 
directors, which is an important shortcoming in the role and the responsibilities of the board. 
 
Finnvera and BancoEstado each have a two board system: a supervisory board and a 
management board (board of directors in the case of Finnvera).  Despite being elected based on 
political criteria, supervisory boards of these two banks have limited responsibilities and have 
more an informational role. The supervisory board helps in informing the political world about 
the policy directions of the bank. Since the supervisory board has no responsibilities in the area 
of credit allocation, they are unable to exert any substantial political influence over the bank’s 
decision.  
 
Regarding the Board of Directors, half of Finnvera’s board is composed of government officials 
and the other half by representatives from the organizations in line with the company’s industrial 
policy. Probably a board composition of this type in other countries runs the risk of appointing 
unqualified civil servants and sophisticated lobbyists from trade unions who would try to extract 
the maximum value of the bank for their individual constituencies, bringing the bank into 
bankruptcy in a short period of time. However, in the case of Finnvera, the board composition 
has brought highly educated public servants and responsible and qualified representatives from 
                                                            
21 When selecting outsider candidates, the government gets exposed to criticism for lack of transparency. 25 
 
trade unions that run the company based on market criteria.  Cultural elements and a good 
corporate law help to explain the effectiveness of the Finnvera approach. In any case, this is not a 
model that should be replicated in economies with weak governance systems and frail 
institutional design. A good practice found in the case of Finnvera is that its CEO is appointed by 
the board of directors. 
  
The management board of BancoEstado, including the CEO, is selected by the President of the 
Republic. Since the return to democracy in 1990, Chilean presidents have been careful to select 
individuals with technical capacity and political affinity with the government coalition. The 
model has worked well, and board positions have been rotated gradually with long overlaps 
among them. However, this procedure is subject to important weaknesses if the President 
changes the criteria for selecting the management board members.
22  The management board acts 
as a triumvirate, as none of its members has individual responsibilities but the management 
board is responsible as a collective group. This system has forced agreements and coordination 
among the three members of the management board. A good corporate law and well defined 
responsibilities for board members have helped to align the interests of the board members with 
their mandate. In addition, BancoEstado is the only bank of the analyzed cases that is supervised 
as a commercial bank.  Prudential supervision has been an important ally of the management 
board in promoting good practices in credit allocation.
23 
 
Ensuring Qualified Management 
A high level of qualification of the senior management is one of the common elements in the 
four cases analyzed.  Management is essential for creating a risk management culture in the 
institution and capacity to operate under market criteria. The capacity for retaining qualified 
management is one of the elements that help to explain the good performance of these four cases.  
Compensation is typically based on market standards, although in some cases it could be slightly 
lower. 
 
In the case of BancoEstado, bringing talented management resources and removing the political 
appointees has been a long process, but it has helped to modernize the bank, allow it to become 




Some countries have designed additional safeguards to deal with political intervention. 
Clarifying the role of the owners, the board of directors, and the management leads to good 
governance which is essential for dealing with political interference, but sometimes it may not be 
                                                            
22 During the military regime in the 70s and 80s, the bank was used politically and its capital was severely eroded. 
23 Many interviewed executives from BancoEstado praised the role of the Supervisor in helping to improve the 
standards of operations of BancoEstado. 26 
 
enough. BDC, for example, as part of good governance practice, reports any undue pressure from 
politicians regarding its credit decisions to its Board of Directors.
24  Since politicians seek to 
avoid making public that they have applied pressure on these institutions to fund projects that 
have ultimately proved to be unprofitable, this measure has dramatically deterred the political 
interference in BDC credit decisions.  This safeguard has been able to successfully alleviate the 
pressure politicians may exercise on BDC successfully. Another example is the case of 
BancoEstado, which by Law is not allowed to lend to government agencies and state owned 
companies.
25 This has limited the pressure on the Board of Directors to finance politically 
motivated unprofitable projects, and has promoted a market test for projects sponsored by the 
government.  In addition, the Law does not authorize BancoEstado to give any type of subsidies. 
This has been an important tool to repel political pressures, and to encourage the Board to focus 
on efficiency. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper discusses good practices for aligning the role of SFIs in solving market failures. The 
paper discusses the experiences of four leading SFIs, namely Canada’s BDC, Chile’s 
BancoEstado, Finland’s Finnvera, and South Africa’s DBSA, in defining, implementing, 
financing and evaluating their mandate, and in avoiding political interference through good 
corporate governance practices.  
The four SFIs analyzed have different checks and balances mechanisms for serving their target 
sectors and limiting political intervention in their credit decisions.  However, they also share 
some common elements: firstly, they have an efficiency objective, which is measured on a 
regular basis by the shareholder. The four SFIs analyzed are required to be profitable on an 
annual basis and the shareholder or the board requires the accomplishment of some 
predetermined objectives.  Secondly, they all have professional and qualified senior management 
supported by proper risk management systems.  Thirdly, they do not depend on government 
support for their funding needs as, with the exception of BDC, they access the bond market on a 
regular basis.
26  This last point is very important as it gives financial independence to the SFI, 
and removes the linkage between the shareholder and the allocation of funds.   
BDC is one of the strongest institutions from almost any point of view, with sound corporate 
governance and a sustainable mandate. The mandate is aimed at mitigating a market failure and 
is implemented in a way that complements the role of private financiers. The functions of the 
main stakeholders of the company are properly defined, and the nomination of board directors 
ensures that directors have the necessary independence and expertise. The government monitors 
                                                            
24 Undue pressure is defined as any behavior that goes beyond presenting a project for evaluation. 
25 This concept also includes ministers and members of the Congress.   
26 Although BDC get funding from the market through the Ministry of Finance, it does not depend on the 
government for passing them funds.  27 
 
BDC regularly, and BDC management promotes owner activism to ensure that its actions are 
understood by the government.  Lack of prudential supervision by a banking supervisor is a 
potential weakness of BDC, which is partially mitigated by a sound corporate governance 
structure and legal, regulatory and institutional foundations that resemble worldwide good 
practices. 
Despite the strong presence of government officials and lobbyists on the supervisory board and 
the board of directors, Finnvera is run in a prudent manner. This is mostly explained by cultural 
factors and sound laws that deal with the cases of potential conflicts of interest. The presence of 
qualified management and the trust on the board in the technical analysis and recommendations 
coming from the management are important elements that help to avoid political interference.  
Weaknesses of Finnvera include the lack of prudential supervision and regulatory forbearance. 
These weaknesses are partially offset by close monitoring by the shareholder against a number of 
short term objectives.  The capacity of the shareholder to coordinate multiple mechanisms for 
servicing the final clients is also remarkable.  
Despite not having a clear mandate defined in the law, BancoEstado’s management board has 
defined objectives, which are aligned with the social objectives of the government. BancoEstado 
has been able to develop sustainable lines of business in the financing of sectors of the economy 
that are not sufficiently well serviced by private financiers, including micro and SME lending. 
The risks of political interference are partially mitigated by rigorous prudential supervision by 
the Chilean banking supervisor, a lack of dependence on funding from the government, good 
corporate governance laws that define the responsibilities of board members, a structure of the 
management board that promotes consensus, a supervisory board with limited powers, and a 
number of clauses that do not allow the bank to give subsidies, and lending to government 
institutions. However, BancoEstado has important weaknesses in the areas of appointment of 
directors and in the description of its mandate.  As happened before the 1990s, the lack of 
transparency in the designation of members of the management board and board of directors may 
bring the bank into an unsustainable equilibrium. In addition, since the mandate is not clearly 
defined, the bank may concentrate efforts into more profitable areas of business not related to the 
social objectives of the government, without a clear counterbalance from the owner.   
DBSA’s sound corporate governance structure is one of its major strengths. This has facilitated 
the presence of an independent and qualified board of directors and a professional management. 
The shareholder also plays an important role in monitoring the short term objectives agreed in 
the annual corporate plan.  The lack of financial dependence from government funding has 
serviced to strength the asset liability management functions of the bank. However, DBSA has 
some weaknesses in describing its mandate, and in finding a sustainable business model for the 
sectors in the target areas. DBSA lives with two conflicting objectives: financing infrastructure 
projects in middle income municipalities, and generating revenues to fund the operations of 
DBSA Development Fund.  Although requiring a minimum return is a desirable objective inside 
a mandate, maximizing profits (with the purpose of funding DBSA Development Fund) may 28 
 
intensify the investments of the bank in commercially oriented projects that are not necessarily 
consistent with social objectives.   
We noticed that little progress has been reached in measuring the public policy performance of 
SFIs. Despite the macro evidence that SFIs do not contribute to economic growth, there is room 
for making more narrow studies about the contribution of specific SFIs in solving a market 
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